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The Bank Charter Act 1844, extended to Ireland via the Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845, 
established a highly restrictive monetary regime in Britain and Ireland, in which 
currency circulation was to be determined by a mechanistic rule-based approach 
rather than by bank discretion. This paper analyses the functioning of the Irish 
banking system during the Great Irish Famine (1845-1850) in the context of this rigid 
monetary regime, focusing in particular on the role of the government chartered 
bank, Bank of Ireland. The analysis is based on archival material from the Bank of 
Ireland Court of Directors, as well as quantitative data detailing note issue by Irish 
banks. This paper contends that while Bank of Ireland was focal point of the Irish 
banking system during the famine years, it perceived itself at this time primarily as 
a commercial bank operating within the prevailing monetary regime rather than as 
a central bank-type entity. Indeed, subsequent characterizations of Bank of Ireland 
as a “de facto” Irish central bank during the 1840s run the risk of overestimating the 
level of institutional agency possessed by Bank of Ireland within the wider monetary 
regime during the famine years.
Introduction
The Bank Charter Act 1844 is regarded as the most significant piece of British 
banking legislation of the nineteenth century. Its implementation in Britain in 1844, 
and extension to Ireland via the Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845, established a highly 
restrictive monetary regime in Britain and Ireland, in which currency circulation 
was to be determined by a mechanistic rule-based approach rather than bank 
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discretion.1 This restrictive monetary regime formed part of the Irish institutional 
and economic landscape on the eve of the Irish famine.2 While the regulations 
surrounding joint-stock banking and currency issue may have been far removed 
from everyday life of those hardest hit by the famine onslaught - those landless 
labourers and cottiers operating largely in a barter economy, in which rent for a 
plot of land to grow potatoes was paid in terms of days worked for the landowner - 
matters of banking and currency were not divorced from the economic and social 
distress of those hardest hit by the famine conditions.3 Indeed, this is illustrated 
by the difficulties encountered by public works initiatives in 1846 in maintaining an 
adequate supply of silver with which to pay wages to those dependent on these 
relief efforts for survival.4
One forceful argument against the implementation of the Bank Charter Act 
1844 was the unwieldiness of a restrictive monetary regime in a time of crisis.5 The 
crux of previous episodes of British financial distress, such as those experienced 
in 1825 and 1836, had been the strains placed on the specie reserves of the Bank 
of England, as gold outflows arising from unexpected bad harvests or speculative 
investment threatened the Bank’s ability to meet its obligation to ensure convertibility 
of bank notes to gold at a fixed price and engendered a lack of public confidence in 
the soundness of bank notes issued by banks other than the government chartered 
Bank of England.6  Indeed, the financial crisis of 1825 was only ameliorated by the 
Bank of England being authorized by the British Treasury to dramatically increase its 
1 In order to regulate the issue of bank notes in Britain, the Bank Charter Act 1844 stipulated 
that the Bank of England was to be split in two, with an Issue Department which would circulate a 
fixed maximum of notes (£14 million) against securities and any further issue backed by bullion, and 
a Banking Department which would continue to operate as a commercial entity; no new banks of 
issue were to be allowed; and existing banks were to have their maximum issue fixed at their existing 
levels. When the Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 extended this legislation to Ireland, the six Irish banks 
of issue were authorized to issue notes to an authorized limit with further notes issues required to be 
back by gold. Clapham, 1944, 179–183; Collins, 1988, 30; Barrow, 1975, 73. 
2 See Read, 2016, for a discussion of this restrictive monetary regime in the context of Britain’s 
overarching macroeconomic policy approach of the 1840s, which sought to maintain: (i) a fixed 
convertible currency, with banknote supply restricted to a multiple of gold reserves; (ii) free capital 
and trade flows; and (iii) an independent monetary and fiscal policy. As Read notes, this policy 
approach inevitably encountered what economists Mundell and Fleming would later characterise 
as a “macro-economic policy trilemma”: these three policy objectives could not be pursued 
simultaneously in a time of financial pressure. The deterioration in 1846 of Britain’s terms of trade, 
as costly imports were required to offset the failed potato harvest, along with the end of the railway 
investment boom and ongoing government expenditure directed towards Irish famine relief led to a 
diminution of the Bank of England’s gold reserve and exerted pressure on the fixed exchange rate 
regime.  Financial crises ensued in April and October 1847, culminating in a temporary suspension 
of the 1844 Bank Charter Act on 25 October 1847. Dornbusch & Frenkel, 1984, 236; Fleming, 1962, 
369–379; Mundell, 1963, 475–485; Read, 2016, 411–434. 
3 Regional and social differences in pre-famine agricultural commercialisation are detailed by Ó 
Gráda, who points firstly to the west of the country as undertaking less commercial farming, due 
to farm sizes being smallest and dependence on the potato as a subsistence crop being greatest, 
and secondly to smallholders and labourers nationwide undertaking less commercial farming, partly 
because they consumed the subsistence potato crop produced on their plot of land and paid their 
rent mostly in labour. Ó Gráda, 1988, 51.
4 Hall, 1949, 218. 
5 See, e.g., Bankers’ Magazine, Jul. 1844, 224.
6 Dimsdale & Hotson, 2014, 33.
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level of note issue in order to assuage panic amongst the general public.7 The Bank 
Charter Act 1844 would remove the discretion of the Bank of England to increase 
the amount of currency in circulation in times of economic stress – a limitation 
which the deficient potato harvest of 1845 would place under severe scrutiny, as it 
necessitated an importation of grain which would trigger an unanticipated outflow 
of gold from the British financial system.8 
The extension of the Bank Charter Act to Ireland in 1845 had far-reaching 
implications for the Irish banking system: it removed the Bank of Ireland’s monopoly 
over the issuing of notes with a 50 mile radius of Dublin; the right of note issue 
was to operate on the same basis across the six existing Irish banks of issue; the 
Act prohibited the entry of new note-issuing banks into the Irish banking system; 
it placed an upper limit on the note issue of Irish banks that could be backed by 
government securities; it fundamentally altered the position of Ireland’s government 
chartered bank, Bank of Ireland, within the Irish banking system; and it furthered an 
ongoing process which saw the Irish banking system increasingly subsumed into a 
wider banking system, centred around the Bank of England. 
The onset of famine resulted in very different consequences for Irish banking 
than it did for the wider Bank of England-centred system. As anticipated by the 
Bankers’ Magazine, the worsening British trade imbalance and the substantial 
diminution of Bank of England gold reserves triggered by the famine conditions 
would inevitably reveal the impolicy of rigid monetary policy in the face of harvest 
failure: 
We repeat, however, for the twentieth time at least, that the most competent judges 
are decidedly of the opinion, that when a drain of specie reaches that point [where 
insufficient gold was at hand to support the issuing of currency in excess of the £14 
million securities-backed note circulation permitted by the Bank Charter Act 1844], Sir 
Robert Peel’s banking law will never work in practice, and that its temporary suspension 
must be the inevitable result.9 
The problem facing Irish banking, however, was entirely different: rather than 
the monetary asphyxiation thrust upon the Bank of England, Ireland was afflicted 
by a debilitating economic marasmus.10 The currency circulating in Ireland 
contracted from £7,404,366 to £3,833,072 from January 1846 to August 1849, an 
unprecedented diminution of circulating medium which, as the Dublin University 
Magazine lamented, was not due to monetary or commercial crisis but rather the 
stagnation of all Irish enterprise and industry in the face of famine conditions: “it 
is because there is nothing to sell, and nobody to buy, that the wants of Ireland, 
7 Clapham, 1944, 98–103; Fetter, 1965, 112–114.
8 Bankers’ Magazine, Oct. 1847, 484.
9 Bankers’ Magazine, Feb. 1847, 265.
10 Anon., 1849, 374.
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in respect to currency, and therefore our supply of currency have diminished one-
half.”11
In the early months of the famine banks did not encounter financial distress, 
as corn prices remained high and public works projects supported currency 
circulation and transactions.12 However, as noted by W.N Hancock, Professor of 
Political Economy in Dublin University (now Trinity College Dublin), the deficient 
potato harvest devastated the rural barter economy and led to a scramble for notes 
of small denomination and silver coin: 
In consequence of the potatoe [sic] failure, the system of barter which had previously 
prevailed in Ireland became no longer possible, and a currency was wanted to supply 
its place; as the transactions which had thus been previously carried on by barter were 
of small amount, and as the only legal currency for small payments in Ireland is silver, 
a demand was immediately created for silver coin.13 
The process by which silver coin was drained from circulation was succinctly 
captured by the Dublin University Magazine: 
this silver coin has been extorted from the industrious classes by the severest pressure. 
[..] The £400,000 in silver coin, which has forced its way into the banks, and now lies 
there a dead and unprofitable weight, is withdrawn from the circulation of the country.
[..] Thus it was that the silver coin, which had been, in more prosperous times, kept in 
circulation in the country was forced upon the banks.14 
Despite their opposition to the monetary regime enshrined in the Bank Charter Act 
1844 and Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845, Hancock and the Dublin University Magazine 
acknowledged that the Irish economic malaise did not arise from inflexible monetary 
rules:
There is not a bank of issue in Ireland at this moment which could not issue, with 
perfect safety and profit, double the amount of its present issue, if they could only 
find in the country customers whose legitimate transactions could accept it. [..] The 
diminishing amount of money in circulation in Ireland is, therefore, quite independent of 
any effect produced by the laws under which our currency system is now regulated.15
It is in this context that this paper analyses the functioning of the Irish banking 
system during the Great Irish Famine (1845-1850), through the lens of the 
government chartered bank, Bank of Ireland. 
11 Anon., 1849, 373.  
12 See footnote 71, below.
13 Bankers’ Magazine, Aug. 1847, 345.
14 Anon., 1849, 380. 
15 Anon., 1849, 374.
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Based on an analysis of archival Bank of Ireland Court of Directors’ Minutes from 
1844-1854, as well as bank-level note issue statistics published in the Bankers’ 
Magazine from January 1846 onwards, two findings emerge that offer insights 
into the nature of Bank of Ireland’s  role within the Irish Banking system: (i) while 
fulfilling public duties as and when they arose was a prerequisite to it receiving its 
government charter, correspondence between the Bank’s directors and the British 
Treasury prior to the implementation of the Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 indicate 
that the Bank of Ireland perceived itself at this time primarily as a commercial bank 
operating within the prevailing monetary regime rather than as a central bank-
type entity; and (ii) while Bank of Ireland assumed a number of responsibilities 
commonly associated with Central Banks, such as lender of last resort in times 
of bank failures, Bank of Ireland’s systemic initiatives were primarily ones which 
aimed to facilitate transactions between itself and other Irish commercial banks. 
To illustrate the partial nature of Bank of Ireland’s systemic involvement in the Irish 
banking system, this paper points to Bank of Ireland’s policy towards note issue 
during the famine years. Once it adjusted to the requirements of Bankers (Ireland) 
Act 1845, Bank of Ireland’s note issue did not approach the limit authorized by 
the Act until economic activity recovered in the years after the famine. In this 
regard, Bank of Ireland’s monetary stance was in keeping with that of the other 
Irish commercial banks during the famine-era: its note issue responded to the level 
of Irish commercial activity and the availability of profitable opportunities to extend 
credit. Indeed, it could be argued that by preventing a Bank of Ireland monopoly of 
note issue, the 1845 Act ultimately stymied any future metamorphosis of Bank of 
Ireland into a fully-fledged central bank.
Taken as a whole, this paper argues that modern-day characterizations of 
Bank of Ireland as a “de facto” central bank during the famine years run the risk 
of overstating the influence of Bank of Ireland within the monetary regime as a 
whole and of overestimating the level of institutional agency that Bank of Ireland 
possessed in terms of Irish famine-era monetary and economic policy.
Bank of Ireland and the Irish Banking System 
 in the Advent of Bank Charter Act
Established through legislative charter in 1783, Bank of Ireland fulfilled the role 
of banker to the government: it administered the lodgement of all public monies, 
received all revenue payments, managed the national debt, and provided short-
term advances to the Irish exchequer.16 The legislation establishing Bank of Ireland 
stipulated that no other body exceeding six persons could issue bills or notes 
payable, thereby granting Bank of Ireland an unrivalled position of strength in the 
Irish banking system. Bank of Ireland’s capital arrangements also afforded it a level 
16 McGowan, 1990, 12–13.
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of government support unavailable to other commercial banks: it has legislative 
approval to raise capital of £600,000 which it then advanced to the government as 
a loan with interest to be paid by an annuity of £24,000.17 In what was a precursor to 
the 1826 Banking Co-partnership Act’s curtailment of Bank of England privileges, 
legislation introduced in 1821 permitted the formation of banks with more than six 
partners beyond a radius of fifty (Irish) miles of Dublin. The Irish Banking Act of 
1824 repealed earlier legislation which had required the names of all partners to 
appear on bank notes and had debarred any banker from engaging in import or 
export trade.18 
These legislative changes ushered in an era of Irish joint-stock banking, as 
evidenced by the founding of Hibernia Bank (1824), Northern Bank (1825), Provincial 
Bank of Ireland (1825), The Belfast Banking Company (1827), National Commercial 
Bank of Ireland (1834), the short-lived Agricultural and Commercial Bank (1834), 
and The Royal Bank of Ireland (1836). The spread of branch banking nationwide 
ensued, as the newly formed joint stock banks established 173 branches between 
them between 1824 and 1845.19 By 1845 the Irish banking system comprised of 10 
Irish joint stock banks and two independent branches of the National Bank (Carrick-
On-Suir and Clonmel), and only four private banks (compared to 22 private banks 
in 1820).20 
This rapid expansion of the Irish banking system ground to a halt with the 1845 
Bankers’ Act (Ireland), which extended the 1844 Bank Charter Act to Ireland. Once 
the 1844 Act was introduced in Britain, it was not possible to allow Bank of Ireland 
to have discretion over note issue within the same monetary system.21 The 1845 
Act removed the Bank of Ireland’s Dublin-centred note issuing privileges, with all 
joint stock banks existing at that time now allowed to issue notes within the Dublin 
region.22 Note issue in Ireland was now limited to a fiduciary issue based on the 
existing circulation of the Joint Stock banks, with any additional issue required to 
be backed by bullion. In this regard, the note issue of Bank of Ireland was now 
subject to the same criteria as the other Irish banks of issue.23  The legislation also 
17 Barrow, 1975, 3.
18 Barrow, 1975, 64.
19 Barrow, 1975, 220.
20 Collins, 1988, 52–53, Table 2.4; savings banks, targeting small savers, and loan fund banks, 
which provision of small investment loans, typically of a few pounds, to traders, crafts people, and 
smallholders, also formed part of the pre-famine Irish banking system. As Ó Gráda notes, both were 
hit hard by the famine: total balances in Ireland’s savings banks fell from £2.92 million in 1845 to 
£1.33 million in 1848, while the aggregate value of loan funds fell from £1.87 million in 1845 to £0.72 
in 1848. Ó Gráda, 1999, 149–156. See also: McLaughlin, 2014, 569–591; Ó Gráda, 2009, 21–36.
21 As the Chancellor of Exchequer noted in a letter to the  Bank of Ireland in April 1845:“it was 
not judged advisable to subject banks in Scotland or Ireland to a different scale from that applied to 
Banks in England”; Bank of Ireland [BOI], Minutes of the Court of Directors [MCD], 23 Apr. 1845.
22 McGowan, 1990, 14. 
23 Letter from the Chancellor of Exchequer to the Bank of Ireland on 22 April 1845: “in the 
amendment which it is proposed to make to the law affecting banking in Ireland, it is not intended to 
make any distinction to the regulations that are applicable to the circulation of the Bank of Ireland 
and which will apply to that of the other banks in Ireland”. BOI, MCD, 23 Apr. 1845.
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deterred the entry of new joint stock companies into the Irish banking system, as 
note issue was only permitted by those joint stock banks already in existence when 
the legislation was introduced in 1845.24 McGowan argues that these legislative 
changes weakened the position of the Bank of Ireland as an emerging Irish central 
bank while strengthening the central position of the Bank of England over the 
monetary system as a whole. On the other hand, Hall, official biographer of Bank 
of Ireland, and MacDonagh both contend that that the 1845 Act extended Bank of 
Ireland’s functioning as a central banking institution, as Bank of Ireland’s leadership 
role amongst Irish joint stock banks became more formal and specific. McDonagh 
cites, by way of example, Bank of Ireland’ development of a clearing house for note 
exchange between Irish banks; its allocation of stock of coin to each of the provincial 
capitals with local agents given discretion in advancing specie for short periods 
to other banks; and, newly freed from interest rate restrictions, the expansion of 
its role as “bankers’ bank”.25 Bank of Ireland had already established itself as a 
lender of last resort, albeit a reluctant one, in exceptional circumstances.26 Munn 
traces Bank of Ireland’s activity in this regard to the crisis of 1814, when three 
Dublin bankers (Robert Shaw and Co., Alexander and Co., and Ball and Co.,) were 
provided with special drawing facilities on the understanding that further assistance 
would not be forthcoming. However, Bank of Ireland was required to take on the 
mantel of lender of last resort once again in 1820, when rising agricultural prices 
eroded public confidence in Irish banks.27 The Bank provided assistance to all 
Dublin banks and a number of country banks, though it could not prevent the wave 
of country bank closures which ensued.28 Further instances of Bank of Ireland’s 
preparedness to grant accommodation to all other Irish banks can be seen in 1833 
(co-operation with Provincial bank), 1836 (Provincial, Agricultural and Commercial, 
Ulster, Hibernian, Belfast, and National banks), and 1839 (Provincial, National, and 
Royal Irish banks).29
The banking architecture that had emerged in the United Kingdom by the 
nineteenth century comprised of three distinct banking systems – in England 
and Wales, in Scotland, and in Ireland – with separate institutional and legal 
developments. However, as Collins notes, “commercial ties between the three 
countries in the form of inter-bank agencies and accounts in London helped 
provide important institutional links across money markets”, and Barrow points to 
market operations undertaken by Bank of Ireland, such as discounting London 
commercial bills and keeping surplus specie reserves on deposit with the Bank of 
24 McGowan, 1990, 35.
25 McDonagh, 1983, 34.
26 McGowan, 1990, 13.
27 Ó Gráda, 1995, 56.
28 Within a two week period in May-June 1820, seven of the fourteen banks servicing the southern 
counties of Ireland had folded. Barrow, 1975, 17–9; Collins, 1988, 12.
29 Hall, 1949, 154–71; Munn, 1983, 26–7.
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England, as facilitating close links between the English and Irish money supply.30 
The 1800 Act of Union, in transferring the Irish seat of Government from Dublin to 
London, led to a shift in the financial centre of power for the Irish banking system. 
The amalgamation of Irish and British exchequers and public debt in 1817, and of 
Irish and British currencies in 1826, bound Irish banking tightly to a wider British 
banking framework in which the Bank of England was the central actor.31 Indeed, 
McDonagh paints a particularly stark picture of this evolving banking landscape: 
“Bank of England now dominated the combined national finances, and Ireland was 
reduced to a branch office of the British treasury”.32 
Notwithstanding this amalgamation of both exchequers and currencies, Bank of 
Ireland has been characterized by Munn as having emerged in the early decades 
of the nineteenth century as the de facto Irish central bank.33 Munn points to three 
aspects of Bank of Ireland’s role within the Irish banking system as being indicative 
of what he considers to be de facto central bank status:  (i) Bank of Ireland’s 
fulfilment of a lender of last resort function for other Irish banks when the need 
arose; (ii) its role as the “bankers’ bank” within the Irish system, a role which despite 
initial reluctance it assumed to a greater extent after the introduction of the 1845 
Act;34 and (iii) its role as “government bank”, which stemmed from its government 
charter.  Ó Gráda characterizes Bank of Ireland’s role in the Irish nineteenth century 
banking system as being that of a quasi-central bank, rather than de facto central 
bank, based on the fact that while Bank of Ireland was the acknowledged lender of 
last resort for Irish banks, it was also their commercial rival. This characterization 
arguably better reflects both the partial nature of Bank of Ireland’s central banking 
functions and the fact that Bank of Ireland faced potential conflicts of interest 
between its public duties and commercial interests.35 Elsewhere, Ó Gráda also 
refers to Bank of Ireland in the early nineteenth century as a proto-central Bank, 
due to its emergence of as lender of last resort within the system.36 However, the 
1845 Act can be seen to stymie any future metamorphosis of Bank of Ireland into 
a fully-fledged central bank, as its prospects of attaining a monopoly over note 
issue were effectively extinguished. As Hall notes, while the the English Act was 
designed so that the issue of notes in England and Wales would ultimately pass 
30 Collins, 1988, 30; Barrow, 1975, 170–5.
31 McGowan, 1990, 13.
32 McDonagh, 1983, 31.
33 Munn, 1983, 19–32.
34  Munn notes that Bank of Ireland’s reluctance to lend to other banks can, in part, be attributed to 
the fact that prior to 1845 it was bound its charter to adhere to a maximum interest rate of 5%. Other 
factors cited are the relative smallness of the Dublin money market, and Bank of Ireland’s view that 
in the normal course of business banks should depend upon their own resources; Munn, 1983, 27–
8.
35 Ó Gráda, 2012, 200.
36 Ó Gráda, 1995, 145.
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into the hands of the Bank of England, Bank of Ireland note-issuing operations 
were regulated on the same basis as the other Irish banks of issue.37 
Bank of Ireland and the Imminent 
Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845
The minutes of the Bank of Ireland Court of Directors meetings in the months 
preceding the introduction of the Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 provide a unique 
insight into the bank’s perception of both its own role in the Irish banking system 
and its concerns regarding the imminent legislation. Analysis of Court of Directors’ 
minutes reveals that the kernel of the bank’s argument against the Bankers (Ireland) 
Act was that of defence of its commercial interests against competitive forces. 
The consequences of the imminent banking regulations for the Irish economy or 
monetary system as a whole are alluded to but do not feature prominently in the 
discussions and correspondence of the directors. The Court of Directors’ minutes 
of this period also reveal that Bank of Ireland perceived itself first and foremost as a 
commercial entity. As discussed below, Bank of Ireland characterised the distinction 
between itself and the other commercial banks in terms of its sound management 
of government funds and substantial capital base, rather than in terms of any claim 
that it provided central banking functions for the other Irish commercial banks or for 
the Irish monetary system as a whole. 
The drafting of the Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 coincided with discussions 
regarding the renewal of Bank of Ireland’s government charter. These discussions 
had been initiated in February 1844 when a Bank of Ireland deputation travelled to 
London to meet the Chancellor of the Exchequer.38 Further meetings ensued in April 
1845 when Bank of Ireland representatives travelled to London at the behest of the 
Prime Minister, Robert Peel.39 On the issue of renewing the bank’s government 
charter, it became clear that this renewal would involve a curtailment of the note 
issue monopoly within a 50 mile radius of Dublin that the bank had enjoyed since 
1821. On April 21st 1845, Bank of Ireland governor, Thomas Crosswaithe reported 
back to his fellow directors that Peel was “quite decidedly against the continuance 
of our privileged distance”.40 The meeting also served as a first briefing by Peel to 
Bank of Ireland regarding his intended Bankers (Ireland) Act.41  
37 Hall, 1949, 211.
38 BOI, MCD, 30 Apr. 1844; Hall, 1949, 201.
39 BOI, MCD, 23 Apr. 1845.
40 BOI, MCD, 23 Apr. 1845.
41 The proposed legislation and removal of Bank of Ireland privileges were further detailed in 
a letter from the Chancellor of Exchequer to Bank of Ireland dated 22 April 1845; in which the 
Chancellor provided assurances to the bank that “the withdrawal of this privilege shall in no degree 
affect the relations between the Bank of Ireland to the Government. We propose that the Bank of 
Ireland should still continue as at present the banker of the State”; BOI, MCD, 23 Apr. 1845.
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Bank of Ireland reluctantly assented to curtailment of its privileges as part of 
the renewal of its government charter, with Crosswaithe appealing to his fellow 
directors to “[forward] any objections which they deem advisable”, before adding 
“we can only add that we do not think better terms can be obtained”.42 His fellow 
directors also appeared to recognise the political expediency of accepting Peel’s 
terms: “we do not consider it necessary to trouble you or our friends with any further, 
than that we are satisfied that you have done as much for our establishment as 
could be expected”.43 However, as the Bankers (Ireland) Act was still at a formative 
stage, Bank of Ireland was invited to outline its concerns regarding the prospective 
legislation.44 The Court of Directors’ minutes from May-June 1845 document these 
concerns and offer insights into Bank of Ireland’s perception of its role within the 
Irish banking system. 
Bank of Ireland’s initial response to the proposed reforms reflected the bank’s 
focal position in the Irish system and indicated the bank’s recognition that stability of 
the banking sector as a whole was a prerequisite for its own wellbeing.  The minutes 
of the Court of Directors record the bank’s initial concerns regarding the proposed 
reforms, as stated in a letter dated 24 April 1845 from the London deputation 
(Thomas Crosswaithe; Thomas Wilson; and George Carr) to the Chancellor (Henry 
Goulbourne).45 The deputation state that they “are of the opinion that sufficient 
checks not provided against the dangers of over issue in the country”, arguing that 
if banks were permitted to issue a proposed legalized circulation of £6,272,000 
not backed by gold, and as those banks also held gold in the region of £1,700,000, 
total Irish note issue could reach £8,000,000 without those banks being required 
to obtain any additional specie.46 Bank of Ireland viewed this proportion of gold 
to note issue as being too low and “liable to abuse, and may give rise to serious 
consequences”.47 This issue of ease of note creation among Irish banks is also 
alluded to in a letter of 23rd May 1845 by George Carr to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, calling for more stringent rules to be put in place.48 
Systemic banking sector concerns are also evident in a letter dated May 10th 
1845 from the Governor to Carr in London, which was written in anticipation of 
draft of the Bankers (Ireland) Act, instructing him to consult with the banks legal 
advisor [Mr. Fairfields] “and lose no time in making any remarks which occur to you 
or him”.49 The letter ends with one guiding principle for Carr in his inspection of the 
imminent draft legislation: “at all events no increase in the number of banks of issue 
42 BOI, MCD, 23 Apr. 1845.
43 BOI, MCD, 23 Apr. 1845.
44 BOI, MCD, 30 Apr. 1845. (Letter from Chancellor of the Exchequer to Bank of Ireland).
45 BOI, MCD, 30 Apr. 1845.
46 BOI, MCD, 30 Apr. 1845.
47 BOI, MCD, 30 Apr. 1845.
48 BOI, MCD, 19 Jun. 1845.
49 BOI, MCD, 10 May 1845.
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will be sanctioned”. This instruction appears to set out in no uncertain terms the 
position of Bank of Ireland with respect to reform of the Irish banking system, and 
is suggestive of commercial rather than public considerations.50 
While issues regarding the soundness of note circulation and the prudence of 
competitor banks arguably pertain to both commercial and public domains, the 
bank’s additional objections to the proposed legislation resided very much within 
the commercial realm. One such issue revolved around the publication of accounts. 
Bank of Ireland strongly objected to proposals that the Act require it to publish 
financial information of a similar level of detail as that required from the Bank of 
England, arguing that as it “no longer has any peculiar control over note issue”, it 
should only be required to publish the same information as other banks of issue.51 
A further commercial concern which arose during the 1845 Act’s passage 
through parliament was that of mortgage lending. Bank of Ireland’s original charter 
prohibited the bank lending on the security of land. At the second reading of the 
bill on 12 June 1845, a motion was tabled by Dundalk MP Thomas Redington 
proposing that Bank of Ireland should be allowed to lend on mortgage in a similar 
manner to other commercial banks. However, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
strongly opposed this motion, arguing that a government chartered bank should 
not be exposed to the financial risk that could arise from this type of lending.52 In 
a subsequent letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Carr appears to concede 
the argument regarding mortgage lending (“we reluctantly yield to your judgment 
on this point”), while continuing to protest against the proposals regarding the 
publication of financial information.53 
Bank of Ireland also moved to protect its existing arrangements regarding 
interest income arising from its management of government funds, objecting to a 
clause in the legislation which appeared to allow for the interest rate receivable to 
be reduced.54  This issue of management of public monies came to the fore again 
in June 1845. A letter dated 13th June 1845 from Carr to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer sees Carr remonstrating against a proposal made by the Chancellor to 
allow banks other than Bank of Ireland receive public monies.55 
Carr’s protestation against any diminution of Bank of Ireland’s responsibilities 
in terms of managing public funds provides an insight into how Bank of Ireland 
perceived its role within the Irish banking system. Carr describes Bank of Ireland 
as “the great chartered bank of the country with a large paid up capital placed in 
the hands of the Government”. In emphasising the bank’s ability to “secure[s] the 
50 BOI, MCD, 10 May 1845.
51 BOI, MCD, 30 Apr. 1845.
52 Hansard, 12 Jun. 1845, cc. 437–9; Hall, 1949, 206.
53 BOI, MCD, 10 Jun. 1845. In 1864 Bank of Ireland was eventually granted the power to extend 
credit secured by mortgage. McGowan, 1990, 15.
54 BOI, MCD, 17, 24 May 1845.
55 BOI, MCD, 14 Jun. 1845.
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payment of those deposits beyond the possibility of loss from adverse times or 
mismanagement”, Carr’s argument contrasts the strength of Bank of Ireland as a 
commercial entity to weaknesses inherent in other Irish banks: “the small paid up 
capital of the other banks, all retained in their own hands; very limited amount of 
government or other immediately available securities compared with the extent of 
their circulation and deposit liabilities”.56 Notable here is Carr’s characterization of 
Bank of Ireland as the sole government approved commercial bank, rather than 
as an institution of systemic importance to the banking system as a whole. Carr’s 
defence of Bank of Ireland’s position was met with approval by Crosswaithe, who 
conveyed “the satisfaction of the court with the prompt and very efficient manner 
in which you resisted the proposal to remove any of the public business from the 
Bank of Ireland.”57 
Bank of Ireland Functions during the Famine Years
This section explores the extent of Bank of Ireland’s central banking functions 
during the famine years, by contrasting its inter-bank endeavors in this period with 
its activities in the sphere of note issue. While the former lend themselves to the 
idea that Bank of Ireland had emerged as a central bank of sorts, the latter appear 
to be primarily concerned with facilitating smooth inter-bank transactions rather 
than an on-going macro-level involvement in monetary policy. 
The Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 received royal assent on 21st July 1845 and 
came into force on 6th December 1845.58 In anticipation of the implementation 
of the Act, Bank of Ireland sought to ensure that additional supplies of gold and 
silver coin would be provided by the Bank of England and the Royal Mint. Bank 
of Ireland initiated this process on 31st July 1845 via a letter to the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, with correspondence continuing throughout the following months.59 
While Hall characterizes this process as one where “the Directors decided that 
the silver coinage should be considerably augmented”, this appears to overstate 
the influence of Bank of Ireland in this instance. The correspondence between 
the two parties depicts the situation as one where Bank of Ireland briefed the 
Chancellor regarding “the necessity which will exist on and after the 6th December 
next for a very considerable augmentation to the amount of silver coin in circulation 
in this country to meet the want of the public consequent on the withdrawal of all 
bank notes for fractional parts of a pound”, with the Chancellor responding that 
he “had anticipated an increased demand for silver in Ireland and that the Mint 
56 BOI, MCD, 14 Jun. 1845.
57 BOI, MCD, 14 Jun. 1845.
58 See http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1845/act/37/enacted/en/print.html for full text of The 
Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict c 37). 
59 BOI, MCD, 31 Jul. 1845.
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was employed in an extensive coinage of silver, with a view to meet it”.60 The onus 
was then on Bank of Ireland to ensure that their request for additional coinage 
was met in a timely manner: “As the period is fast approaching when that supply 
will be required, our Court have requested me to beg you will be kind enough to 
give me some idea of the probable period when its delivery in this country may be 
expected.”61 
On September 23rd, Bank of Ireland estimated that, in addition to the £125,000 it 
had imported in the preceding months for its own needs, a further £300,000 would 
be required to meet the want of silver in Irish circulation. The Bank’s justification for 
this exigency acknowledges the impact of legislative change on Irish demand for 
silver coin but otherwise appears to be somewhat ambiguous, given the unfolding 
events surrounding the deficient potato crop: “there are complaints of a want of 
silver in Ireland consequent it is supposed on the full employment of the working 
classes, and there will be a considerable sum required on the withdrawal of all 
bank notes containing fractional parts of pound”.62 
On 28th October, Bank of Ireland requested an additional £125,000 in silver 
coin (“The suppression of the notes for the fractional part of one pound renders 
it necessary to provide a considerable quantity of silver”), as well as £200,000 in 
gold.63 The latter request was made in the context of adjustment to the imminent 
legislative changes: “Although at present we anticipate no difficulty in the working 
of the Banking Bill in Ireland, yet at the period when the act comes into operation 
is fast approaching, we should like [..] to make such arrangements with your bank 
as might [facilitate] the obtaining gold, if under any unforeseen emergency such 
should be required.”64 The Governor of the Bank of England stated his willingness to 
accommodate the Bank of Ireland in these requests, with the seamless introduction 
of the legislation appearing to be paramount: “it is scarcely necessary for me to 
state that every facility which the Bank of England can legitimately grant to the 
Bank of Ireland in carrying out the new Irish Bank Bill, will be readily afforded.”65 On 
24th November Bank of Ireland requested that a further £200,000 of gold be made 
available, with their correspondence suggesting that deteriorating local conditions, 
rather than contingency in the face of legislative change, were coming to the fore: 
“we had hoped we were sufficiently provided with specie to meet the operation of 
[the] Banking act, but the demands on us for our notes, from a variety of causes, 
are such that I feel we shall be obliged to import a further amount of Gold to the 
extent at present of £200,000. […] One of the causes I allude to is the existence at 
60 BOI, MCD, 17 Sep. 1845.
61 BOI, MCD, 17 Sep. 1845.
62 BOI, MCD, 23 Sep. 1845.
63 BOI, MCD, 28 Oct. 1845.
64 BOI, MCD, 28 Oct. 1845.
65 BOI, MCD, 31 Oct. 1845
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present of a run on the savings banks here, which may continue and extend.”66  The 
Bank also refers to the tendency of the public to “hoard our notes.”67 
Despite this indication of financial stress in November 1845, Irish commercial 
banks did not encounter significant difficulties in 1845 or 1846. In testimony before 
the Committee on Commercial Distress on 27th June 1848, Robert Murray, General 
Manager of Provincial Bank, notes that it was not until the 1846 potato crop failed 
that “very great apprehensions were entertained”, with “the demand for money 
for the supply of food [becoming] very large during the months of November and 
December 1846”.68 Murray attributed the banks’ vigour despite the deteriorating 
conditions in large part to government expenditure on public relief works:
The issue of the banks in Ireland was kept up in 1846 almost entirely by the Government 
expenditure; there was less produce, the growth of Ireland, to sell in 1846 than in 1847, 
but yet the issue kept up, both of bank notes and of silver in the hands of the lower orders, 
and in 1847 it was very much diminished in amount by reason of the discontinuance of 
that expenditure, and the country was thrown upon its own resources.69 
In its capacity of banker to the state, Bank of Ireland was designated by the 
British Treasury as agent for the Board of Public Works in the handling of relief 
funds. The minutes of the Court of Directors record a letter from Charles Trevelyan 
dated 4th September 1846, in which the Treasury consigning £80,000 in silver 
coins to Ireland via the steamship Comet “in order to enable the Bank of Ireland 
to continue to afford to the Board of Public Works in Ireland the assistance which 
has hitherto been given by that establishment in the payment of the men employed 
up on relief works”.70 In November 1846 Bank of Ireland advised the Treasury that 
demand for silver coin “on account of the Board of Public works have been so 
great as nearly to exhaust that supply in some and greatly exceed it at others of the 
various places at which it was deposited and also a very large sum of the ordinary 
supply kept by the bank at other locations for the general wants of the country […] 
I am now advised by the Board of Works that an immediate supply of £50,000 is 
required and a further supply of £50,000 will most probably be also required”.71 By 
the month of January 1847, a total sum of £1,000,000 had been sent from London 
w, with the need for further funds anticipated.72 Bank of Ireland for its part was 
anxious to ensure that it would not be charged commission by the Bank of England 
for this non-commercial transfer of funds, and its representations to the Bank of 
66 BOI, MCD, 24 Nov. 1845
67 BOI, MCD, 24 Nov. 1845.
68 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, qq. 6669, 6672.
69 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6669.
70 BOI, MCD, 4 Sep. 1846.
71 BOI, MCD, 17 Nov. 1846.
72 BOI, MCD, 23 Jan. 1847. 
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England on the matter in January 1847 the bank was keen to downplay its role in 
the process: 
That as a Government operation originating in England from Public Revenue lodged in 
the Bank [of England] there, the transmission of these monies as a matter of account 
between the two Banks may be looked on rather as a transaction of the Bank of England 
than of the Bank of Ireland.73
Bank of Ireland undertook two further initiatives in the wake of the 1845 Act 
which were of significance for the Irish banking system as a whole. Firstly, the 
establishment of a note clearing system in November 1845 saw Bank of Ireland 
place on formal footing the note exchange facilities that it had previously been 
providing for other Irish joint-stock banks.74 Secondly, Bank of Ireland extended its 
role as “bankers’ bank” to the Irish joint-stock banks.75 The two Dublin-based non-
issuing joint stock Banks (Hibernian Bank and Royal Bank), who had agreed to 
issue Bank of Ireland notes exclusively, were afforded overdraft facilities at 2 per 
cent below the usual overdraft rate.76 The three joint stock banks of issue whose 
head offices were situated in the North of Ireland (the Northern, Belfast and Ulster 
Banks) were also accommodated with overdraft facilities up to a limit of £150,000 
on the deposit of bills or other securities, at the current rate charged by the Bank 
of England.77 
Munn characterizes these Bank of Ireland initiatives as the adoption of a co-
operative response to the curtailment of its monopoly position under new legislation.78 
Both Hall and McGowan refer to these initiatives as indications of Bank of Ireland’s 
leadership amongst the Irish joint-stock banks, with the former noting the changing 
relationship between the Irish joint stock banks subsequent to the 1845 Act: “its 
[Bank of Ireland] leadership of the Irish banks became more formal and specific”.79 
These commentators tend to discuss the Bank’s growing dominance among Irish 
joint-stock banks in terms of an extension of its role as a central bank. While Bank 
of Ireland was in a position to exert its influence over the other Irish joint-stock 
banks, it is also important to recognize the limit of the Bank’s focal role within 
the Irish banking system. Given the fact that the Irish currency resided within a 
wider monetary union, as well as the restrictive nature of the Bank Charter and 
Bankers (Ireland) Acts, the constraints on Bank of Ireland’s systemic influence are 
73 BOI, MCD, 23 Jan. 1847.
74 BOI, MCD, 5 Nov. 1845. For details regarding the workings of the exchange, see McDonagh, 
1983, 36. Munn notes that Irish note clearing arrangements were based on the Scottish model and 
were twenty years ahead of a similar initiative in England. Munn, 1983, 31. 
75 The 1845 Act abolished the 5% ceiling on the interest rate that Bank of Ireland could charge on 
loans. McGowan, 1990, 15.
76 Hall, 1949, 212–4;  McDonagh, 1983, 36.
77 Hall, 1949, 212–4;  McDonagh, 1983, 36.
78 Munn, 1983, 31.
79 McDonagh, 1983, 36.
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discernable in relation to note issue during the famine years. As outlined below, 
the Bank’s approach to note issue appears to adhere to a commercial banking 
rationale rather than that of a macro-level central banking entity. 
Irish banking activity and currency circulation remained robust in 1845 and 
1846 despite the onset of famine conditions, as temporary public relief measures 
and high grain prices supported ongoing commercial activity.80 As illustrated in 
Figures 1 and 2 below, total Irish note issue remained above the limit [£6,354,494] 
authorized by the Bankers (Ireland) Act until May 1847. The circulating medium 
then contracted rapidly: by September 1849 it had diminished by over one third, 
and note issue levels did not approach the authorized limit again until 1853. In his 
testimony before the Committee on Commercial Distress, Robert Murry (Provincial 
Bank) attributed the currency contraction to the debilitating effects of harvest failure 
on trade and commercial activities:
The greater portion of the produce of Ireland is provisions, and there was, comparatively 
speaking, none to sell; that which produced circulation in Ireland had almost ceased to 
exist for such a purpose; the provisions grown in the country during the year 1846 and 
during the last year were altogether wanted for the sustentation of the people of the 
country ; they were not to be exported; the people consumed the whole, and they had 
nothing to sell ; they could not both eat and sell it; therefore, that which had produced 
circulation before had disappeared, and could not be brought to market. 
Further insight into famine-era changes in both the note issue and specie 
holdings of Irish banks can be seen in Figures 3 and 4. While note issue remained 
above the authorized limit in 1845 and 1846, banks were required to back this 
excess note issue with gold holdings. However, once note issue began to diminish 
in 1847, banks reduced their gold holdings.81 The pattern of notes issued under £5 
is also indicative of the diminution of trade related to agriculture, as notes of small 
denominations were of particular importance in agricultural trade.82 The increase of 
silver holdings among the Irish banks illustrates a phenomenon alluded to earlier: 
as failure of the potato crop impeded the workings of the rural barter economy, 
silver coin was “abstracted out of the hands of the lower orders, with whom silver 
circulates to a large extent; in consequence of the severe and continued pressure 
80 Hall, 1949, 218.
81 As Murry noted in his evidence before the Committee: “the price of corn and produce of every 
kind not only ranged high in 1845 and 1846, but the issue during those years, particularly in the 
months of November, December, January and February, got considerably in excess of the permitted 
issue, consequently the banks were called upon to keep an excess of gold at the head offices over 
the permitted circulation”. Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6691.
82 Gilbart sets out what he considered to have been the key features of Irish currency circulation 
at the time. According to Gilbart, the annual changes in the Irish circulation were governed chiefly 
by the quality of the harvest and the prices of agricultural products. Circulation was traditionally at 
its lowest point in August and September prior to the harvest, and then rose rapidly until January, 
after which point it gradually declined. Notes of the smallest denomination experienced the most 
significant increase, as these were extensively used in the purchase and sale of agricultural produce; 
Gilbart, 1852, 307–326.
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upon them, it was wrung out of their little hoards and keeping places, and placed 
in the hands of the banks.”83
The rationale of commercial banks for contracting their note issue was, in 
Murray’s view, one of lack of profitable opportunities. When asked if the diminution 
in the amount of money employed in discounts had arisen from a diminution of the 
demand for it, or as a result of the diminution of the credit of individuals, Murray’s 
response indicated that by 1847 Irish commercial activity had ground to a halt:
Both causes operated; where parties failed, your business was merely to wind up their 
accounts as soon as you could; and there was also a want of commodities upon which 
to advance money; there were not the commodities to buy and sell in Ireland, which 
gave illegitimate rise to commercial transactions, and consequently there was a great 
decrease of commercial bills from the commencement of the year 1847 to the present 
date [June 1848]; that has existed and still continues.84 
When Bank of Ireland’s note issue is examined during the famine years, as well 
as pre- and post-famine, it is seen to behave in a manner very similar to that of the 
note issuing Irish joint stock banks. Table 1 summarizes the correlation coefficients 
of monthly note issue growth rates between Bank of Ireland and the other Irish 
note-issuing banks from April 1843 to December 1854. Bank of Ireland monthly 
note issue growth appears to be highly correlated with that of the other banks in 
question [0.48-0.83], particularly with that of Provincial Bank [0.83]. 
Bank of Ireland does not appear to lead other Irish banks, aside from the three 
northern Irish banks that it accommodated with overdraft facilities. As illustrated by 
Provincial Bank’s 1-month lead correlation coefficient [0.28], the note issue growth 
of other Irish banks for a given month is not highly correlated with Bank of Ireland 
note issue growth of the previous month. If anything, there is an indication that 
Bank of Ireland’s note issue growth tended to lag one month behind that of its 
competitor, Provincial Bank [0.54].85 Indeed, Gilbart notes that the note-issuing joint-
stock banks whose branches were chiefly located in agricultural districts tended to 
expand circulation more rapidly in response to the harvest season than Bank of 
Ireland, whose branch network was predominantly located in large towns.86
83 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6607.
84 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6761.
85 Gilbart, 1852, 308.
86 By 1845, Provincial Bank had opened 38 branches nationwide (including head offices), with 25 
branches located in towns recorded in 1841 census as have population of less than 10,000). Bank 
of Ireland, in comparison, had established 24 branches  nationwide by 1845, of which seven were in 
towns of population less than 10,000. See Barrow, 1975, 215–219 (App. 3).
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Table 1: Correlation Coefficient of monthly growth in note issue, April 1843–Dec 1854 (Bank 
of Ireland: 1 month lead, contemporaneous and 1 month lag).
Source: Author’s calculations based on data available from Bankers’ Magazine, various issues. 
A further insight into the mindset of commercial banks in the initial years of 
the famine is provided by Murray’s description of Provincial Bank’s discount rate 
policy. Provincial bank feared exposure to the risks inherent in grain speculation 
and sought to limit this activity by reducing discounting facilities and increasing 
discount rates: 
There was a strong impression, from the large supplies of food that must be imported 
into Ireland, in consequence of the failure of the potato crop, money must become 
scarce, and that therefore it was necessary to increase the value of it, in order to 
prevent over-speculation in food; and it was deemed necessary, in the months 
of November and December, to look very cautiously to all transactions, and, upon 
particular transactions, to increase the rate of discount, though there was no increased 
rate of interest generally, till the 26th of January,1847.87 
Bank of Ireland’s discount rate for Irish bills can be seen to have moved in a 
similar fashion: the rate was initially increased to 5% on 5th November 1845, at 
which it stayed until 27th January 1847 when it was raised to the same level of the 
Provincial rate (51/2%). The banks continued to raise their interest rates in tandem 
throughout 1847, reaching a peak of 8% in October 1847 at the height of the British 
financial crisis.88 
Although succinct relative to that of Robert Murray, the testimony of Bank of 
Ireland governor John McDonnell before the Committee on Commercial Distress 
provides insight into bank’s views regarding circulation during the famine years. 
When asked if he was aware of any want of circulation in Ireland, McDonnell’s 
response (“I think not, I am not aware of any complaint of that sort”89) is supportive 
of the view set out in greater detail by Robert Murray (above) that circulation levels 
were a reflection of the diminished level of trade undertaken in Ireland during the 
famine years. Indeed, when Murray was asked if during the commercial distress of 
1847 he felt a want of circulation, his answer was a terse “None”.90 
87 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6672.
88  Bank of Ireland discount rate changes from Jan.-Oct. 1847: 27 Jan. (51/2%); 12 Apr. (6%); 6 May 
(7%); 14 Jul.  (61/2%); 27 Oct. (8%); Provincial Bank discount rate changes from Jan.-Oct. 1847: 26 
Jan. (51/2%); 23 Mar. (6%); 5 May (61/2%); 15 May (7%); 14 Jul. (61/2%); 27 Oct. (8%). 
89 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6616.
90 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6698.
 Clonmel  
National 
Bank
Carrick-on-
Suir National 
Bank
National 
Bank
Ulster 
Bank
Northern 
Bank
Belfast 
Bank
Provincial 
Bank
Bank of Ireland (+1) 0.36 0.34 0.62 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.28
Bank of Ireland 0.70 0.61 0.59 0.59 0.48 0.55 0.83
Bank of Ireland (-1) 0.47 0.46 0.26 0.41 0.24 0.30 0.54
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More generally, on the impact of the Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 on Bank of 
Ireland, McDonnell did acknowledge a role for Bank of Ireland in influencing Irish 
currency circulation, but argued that this role had been diminished by the removal 
of the bank’s monopoly on note issue within the 50-mile radius of Dublin; “under 
the former state of things the Bank had the power, if too full a circulation took place, 
in some degree of checking it; that power was taken from them, and I think in that 
way it [the Act of 1845] operated injuriously”.91 While appealing to a circumscribed 
ability to discharge public duty may have had a strategic dimension in this instance, 
it nonetheless serves as a reminder that while a number of Bank of Ireland’s 
systemic functions within the Irish context expanded in the aftermath of the 1845 
Act, the Act crucially did not envisage Bank of Ireland developing a note-issue 
monopoly along the lines of that envisaged for the Bank of England. 
Despite this, McDonnell was firmly of the view that the 1845 Act did not inhibit 
the practical workings of Bank of Ireland during the famine years: “The Act of 1845 
regulated the Irish banks and the Scotch banks; I think it had very little effect in 
Ireland, and no injurious effect I should say. […] My impression is that it afforded 
greater protection to the general credit of the country, and prevented much of the 
misery and ruin which would have resulted if banking had been ad libitum, as it 
was before.”92 The prohibition on the new banks of issue entering the Irish banking 
system appears to have been a particularly welcome development for Bank of 
Ireland: “Banking before that time had not been, I think, managed with the care, 
or based on the capital, that ought to form the basis of banking, and banks were 
formed that never ought to have been permitted to issue paper; the Acts of 1844 
and 1845 put a stop to that.”93 
Conclusion
The difficulty in assessing the functioning of central banks in former times stems 
from the heterogeneity of their origins and development. As the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) have noted in a recent study, the earliest progenitor central banks 
were the dominant commercial issuers of banknotes and bankers to the government 
– with the former, frequently bestowed via government privilege, providing these 
banks with sufficient scale to support government banking requirements.94 While 
monetary stability was crucial to these banks, this was motivated by their desire 
to ensure their own liquidity rather than by wider macroeconomic concerns.95 The 
development of lender of last resort functions and informal banking supervision 
91 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6618.
92 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, qq. 6612, 6644.
93 Committee on Commercial Distress, 1848, q. 6613.
94 Bank for International Settlements [BIS], 2009, 17–20. 
95 BIS, 2009, 19.
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were also driven by commercial self-interest rather than by a public-good objective. 
As long as mechanical standards of convertibility, such as the gold standard, 
remained in place, central bank discretion in terms of monetary policy and currency 
management was greatly circumscribed. 
While modern-day definitions of central bank functions encompass a wide 
range of monetary policy and regulatory functions, central banking in the mid-
nineteenth century was still at a formative stage.96 Indeed, the Bank Charter Act 
1844 and the mechanistic monetary regime which it implemented represented a 
legislative initiative to fundamentally alter the early development of one of the most 
influential central banks of that time, the Bank of England.  The ad hoc development 
of central banks from commercial entities to public institutions is neatly captured by 
Andreadēs in his biography of the Bank of England: “in 1844 people were very far 
from anticipating [..] that the Bank would cease to be a bank of discount and would 
become the guardian of the cash reserve for the commercial world.”97
This institutional ambiguity also applied to nineteenth century Bank of Ireland 
within the Irish banking system, and was complicated yet further by the gravitational 
pull exerted on the bank by the Bank of England and British Treasury. As discussed 
above, the government-sponsored Bank of Ireland was called upon to both fulfil 
routine public duties, such as the collection of public monies, and to execute 
exceptional interventions on behalf of the government, such as facilitating the 
introduction of the new banking legislation, the transmission of relief funds, and 
alleviation of banking crises. Bank of Ireland was also keen to maintain its dominant 
position among the Irish joint-stock banks, and indeed when the Bankers (Ireland) 
Act 1845 altered the Irish banking landscape, Bank of Ireland moved to extend and 
make more formal the exchange and overdraft facilities it afforded to the other Irish 
joint-stock banks. 
This chapter argues however, that while Bank of Ireland fulfilled a leadership 
role amongst other Irish joint-stock banks, it is important to appreciate the limits 
of Bank of Ireland’s influence within a monetary system that by the mid-nineteenth 
century has become increasingly centered around the Bank of England. Given the 
fact that the Irish currency formed part of a wider monetary union, as well as the 
restrictive nature of the Bank Charter and Bankers (Ireland) Acts, the constraints on 
Bank of Ireland’s systemic influence are discernable in relation to note issue during 
the famine years. With the Bank Charter Act 1844 envisaging a monetary system in 
which currency circulation would regulated in a mechanistic fashion via the Bank of 
England, it was inevitable that Bank of Ireland’s discretion in relation to note issue 
would be greatly circumscribed. As mentioned earlier, the Bankers (Ireland) Act 
1845 may have ultimately stymied any future metamorphosis of Bank of Ireland into 
a fully-fledged central bank by preventing a Bank of Ireland monopoly of note issue 
and holding all Irish note-issuing joint stock banks to the same criteria regarding 
96 Archer & Moser-Boehm, 2014, 7–8.
97 Andreadēs, 1924, 246.
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authorized note issue and gold-back note issue beyond the authorized limit. In any 
event, Bank of Ireland does not appear to have played an active ongoing macro-
level role in monitoring or directing monetary conditions in Ireland in the years 
after 1845. Bank of Ireland’s monetary stance appears to have been in keeping 
with that of the other Irish commercial banks during the famine-era: its note issue 
responded to the level of Irish commercial activity and the availability of profitable 
opportunities to extend credit. 
As this chapter shows, fundamentally Bank of Ireland perceived itself at this 
time primarily as a commercial bank operating within the prevailing monetary 
regime rather than as a central bank-type entity. Correspondence between 
the bank’s directors and the British Treasury prior to the implementation of the 
Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 sees the bank define itself in terms of its performance 
in handling government monies and its substantial capital base rather than in terms 
of its systemic import within the Irish banking system. Fulfilling public duties as 
and when they arose was a prerequisite to it receiving its government charter, and 
the inter-bank initiatives it undertook from 1845 onwards were primarily focused 
on facilitating smoother transactions between Irish joint stock banks as well as 
enhancing its own dominant position among these joint stock banks.
Understanding the role of Bank of Ireland within the Irish banking system on the 
eve of the famine is significant as it provides an insight into the Irish institutional 
landscape at this critical juncture in Irish history. The onset of the famine had 
deleterious effects on Irish economic and commercial activity, as evidenced by the 
dramatic contraction of Irish currency circulation from 1847 until the early 1850s. 
Rather than subscribing to a broad brush depiction of Bank of Ireland as a central 
banking entity at this time, a more detailed exploration of its role and functions 
during the famine years indicates that it was not endowed with the institutional 
agency required to assume an active role in directing Irish monetary affairs at this 
time. Indeed, it may be that the strength of its inter-bank leadership within the Irish 
context at that time obscures our view of Bank of Ireland’s limited ability to exert 
influence across a wider monetary system centered around the Bank of England.
The author wishes to thank Bank of Ireland for granting access to their archives of 
the proceedings of nineteenth century Court of Directors’ Meetings. The author is 
also very grateful for research assistance provided by Chitra Raghu. 
References
Dublin, Bank of Ireland: Minutes of the Court of Directors
The Bankers (Ireland) Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict c 37). Full text available online at http://www.
irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1845/act/37/enacted/en/print.html (accessed 30 June 2016)
“The Enormous Failure of Nature”: Famine and Society in the Nineteenth Century
42
Bankers’ Magazine
Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates.
Reports from the Select Committee on Commercial Distress 1847-8 (395) VIII
Andreadēs, A.M. 1924. History of the Bank of England: 1640 to 1903. 2nd ed. London: P.S. King 
& Son.
Anon. 1849. Agriculture and Commerce Condition of Ireland: The Bank Returns. Dublin 
University Magazine CII, 34, 371–381.
Archer, D. & P. Moser-Boehm. 2013. Central Bank Finances. BIS Papers No. 71. Basel: Bank 
for International Settlements.
Bank for International Settlements. 2009. Issues in the Governance of Central Banks: A Report 
from the Central Bank Governance Group. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. 
Barrow, G.L. 1975. The Emergence of the Irish Banking System 1820-1845. Dublin: Gill & 
Macmillan.
Clapham, J. 1944. The Bank of England: A History. Volume 2 1797-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Collins, M. 1988. Money and Banking in the UK. A History. New York: Croom Helm. 
Dimsdale N. & A. Hotson. 2014. Financial Crises and Economic Activity in the United Kingdom 
since 1825. In N. Dimsdale & A. Hotson (eds.) British Financial Crises Since 1825. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dornbusch R. & J.A. Frenkel. 1984. The Gold Standard and the Bank of England in the Crisis 
of 1847. In M.D. Bordo & A.J. Schwartz (eds.) A Retrospective on the Classic Gold 
Standard 1821-1931. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Fetter, F.W. 1965. Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy. 1797-1875. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Fleming, M.J. 1962. Domestic Financial Policies Under Fixed and Under Floating Exchange 
Rates. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 9, 369–379.
Gilbart, J.W. 1852. On the Laws of the Currency in Ireland, as exemplified in the changes that 
have taken place in the amount of bank notes in circulation in Ireland, since the passing 
of the Act of 1845. Journal of the Statistical Society of London 15:4, 307–326.
Hall, F.G. 1949. The Bank of Ireland, 1783-1946: Dublin & Oxford: Hodges Figgis.
McDonagh, O. 1983. The Victorian Bank, 1824-1914. In F.S.L. Lyons (ed.) Bicentenary Essays 
Bank of Ireland. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. 
McGowan, P. 1990. Money and Banking in Ireland: Origins, Development and Future. Dublin: 
Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland.
McLaughlin, E. 2014. “Profligacy in the encouragement of Thrift”: Savings banks in Ireland, 
1817-1914. Business History 56:4, 569–591.
Mundell, R.A. 1963. Capital mobility and stabilization policy under fixed and flexible exchange 
rates. Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science 29:4, 475–485.
Munn, C.W. 1983. The emergence of central banking in Ireland: the Bank of Ireland 1814-1850. 
Irish Economic and Social History 10, 19–32.
Ó Gráda, C. 1988. Ireland Before and After the Famine: Explorations in Economic History 
1800-1925. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Ó Gráda, C. 1995. Ireland: A New Economic History. Oxford & New York: Clarendon Press. 
Ó Gráda, C. 1999. Black ‘47 and Beyond: The Great Irish Famine in History, Economy, and 
Memory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Declan Curran
43
Ó Gráda, C. 2009. Savings Banks, famine, and financial contagion: Ireland in the 1840s and 
1850s, Irish Economic and Social History 36, 21–36.
Ó Gráda, C. 2012. The Last Major Irish Bank Failure Before 2008. Financial History Review 
19:2, 199–217. 
Read, C. 2016. Laissez-faire, the Irish famine, and British financial crisis, Economic History 
Review, 69:2, 411–434. 
Figure 1: Average monthly note issue (Bank of Ireland and total Irish), April 1843–Dec 1854
Source: Bankers’ Magazine, various issues.
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Figure 2: Average monthly note issue by Irish joint-stock banks, April 1843–Dec 1854
Source: Bankers’ Magazine, various issues.
Figure 3: Average monthly Irish note issue by note type, Jan 1846–May 1848
Source: Second Report of the Committee on Commercial Distress 1848, Q. 6691.
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Figure 4: Average monthly gold and silver holding of Irish banks, January 1846–May 1848
Source: Second Report of the Committee on Commercial Distress 1848, Q. 6691.
